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Introduction 
 
The threat that was presented to Western Europe by the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact 
during the Cold War forced NATO countries to concentrate scarce resources on providing 
combat systems that provided the maximum deterrent value.  This unfortunately, was at the 
expense of combat service support (CSS), forcing the British Army to rely on the secure lines 
of communication through allied countries and prepositioning of stocks both forward and in 
the rear areas. 
 
The collapse of the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union has caused Western armed forces to focus 
on force projection, expeditionary operations and manoeuvre warfare, given that there is no 
longer a direct threat to Western Europe.  This necessitates a move from a Just-in-Case (JIC) 
approach, with large-scale stockpiling at all levels of the logistic chain, to one that is nearer a 
Just-in-Time (JIT) approach.  This will mean a greater emphasis on the ability of 
commanders to more accurately predict their requirements will be dependent on total asset 
visibility and guaranteed lines of communication.  In working to reduce the risks still 
inherent in trying to provide such operational logistic support, the military should remain 
aware of the potential contribution that commercial organisations can provide.  In the past, 
the military have traditionally had a less than enthusiastic attitude about the potential benefits 
to be gained from industry.  Contracts were often characterised by a confrontational attitude 
but are now moving to a far more positive stance and a co-operative relationship where both 
risks and benefits can be shared. 
 
The Labour Government’s Strategic Defence Review (SDR), published in July 1998, aimed 
to “remodel Britain’s defence policy and Armed Forces to meet the challenges of the next 
century.  The government’s aim is strong, modern and cost-effective defence, now and for 
the longer term”.1 It is very likely that there will be a continuing, if not increased contribution 
to international peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention operations, some of which may 
be of considerable duration and logistically very challenging. The size and scope may also 
vary, although the review outlined the requirement that the Armed Forces should be able to 
carry out two medium-sized contingency operations at the same time.  It also highlighted that 
the Armed Forces will need to go to the operation rather than have the operation come to 
them.  The areas that they may have to deploy to are unlikely to have the same levels of 
infrastructure as those of Western Europe and that forces may “have to sustain non-
warfighting operations for indefinite periods whilst retaining the ability to respond to other 
contingencies.  This calls for rather different force projection capabilities than we have 
needed in the past.”2 Sustainability, which can be defined as “the ability of a force to 
maintain the necessary level of combat power for the duration required to achieve its 
objectives”3, has grown in importance and necessity now that the Cold War is over.  The 
difficulties involved in achieving the right level of sustainability should not be 
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underestimated as “setting appropriate levels of logistic sustainability is a difficult task in an 
environment where there is no apparent adversary, and where the new risks are less clearly 
defined than before”.4 
 
With the ‘peace dividend’ bringing a reduction of the defence budget by some 23% in real 
terms and the British Armed Forces being cut back by a third, new operational imperatives 
have placed increasing strain on the Armed Forces, particularly in their ability to sustain 
overseas operations.5  This paper will focus on the logistics approach as used by the British 
Armed Forces during the Cold War, what it is today and what future operations may involve. 
It will also look at certain aspects of commercial logistics practice and see what could be 
applied to the British Armed Forces. 
 
Current British Army Logistics and The Legacy of the Cold War 
 
Throughout history, logistics has had an important influence on the conduct of military 
operations. Indeed, many an operation has owed its success or failure to the logistics 
preparation or lack of it.  “Throughout the struggle, it was in his logistic inability to maintain 
his armies in the field that the enemy’s fatal weakness lay. Courage his forces had in full 
measure, but courage was not enough.”6  It must be remembered that it is not merely the 
amassing of men and materiel that counts, but also the balanced and timely application of 
those resources at hand that is as important.  If applied correctly, such logistics support can 
have a force multiplier effect. Logistics are required to sustain operations and provide a link 
to those forces on active duty from the strategic resources held  in the UK.  It is “the process 
whereby organisation, management and direction transforms human and materiel inputs to 
confer sustainability, is a continuum – an uninterrupted and ordered flow”.7  Logistics has 
also been described as “the bridge connecting a nation’s economy to its warfighting forces”.8 
 
During the Cold War, the UK and NATO countered the perceived threat from the Soviet 
Union and Warsaw Pact by adopting a positional defence strategy in Central Europe.  A 
significant proportion of NATO’s combat forces was positioned forward in West Germany 
(although not necessarily in their wartime deployment areas).  Reinforcement plans existed 
however, to deploy the remainder there as quickly as possible should an emergency arise and 
were practised from time to time (for example the REFORGER exercises practised by the 
United States, and Exercise LIONHEART by the UK).  The force was configured at a variety 
of readiness standards (to indicate the amount of time needed to prepare for combat) in order 
to fight (it assumed) a short, high intensity conventional war.9  The defensive posture was 
based upon the ‘layer cake’ principle10 with a designated Alliance member being responsible 
for a section of the line.11 
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As a result, British logistic philosophy since 1945 has been to concentrate on linear lines of 
supply to sustain defensive operations in Central Europe.  To counter the perceived threat 
from those Warsaw Pact forces stationed in East Germany, the British Army of the Rhine 
(BAOR) was stationed around the North German Plain close to its predetermined deployment 
positions.  On mobilisation BAOR would become the 1st British (BR) Corps and its defensive 
plan had been rehearsed and developed over a number of years to counter the known Warsaw 
Pact threat.  The defensive plan called for NATO forces to attempt to inflict maximum 
casualties on the numerically superior Warsaw Pact while trying to preserve themselves. In 
delaying the Warsaw Pact, forward NATO forces would hope to buy time for reinforcements 
to be flown in from the UK and USA.12 
 
To sustain this sort of deployment, the scale of logistics support was massive and the 
accepted NATO stock level was for thirty days worth of supplies. 1st (BR) Corps stocks were 
held at successive levels, from the first line in unit stores, through forward storage sites, 
corps ordnance and ammunition depots and finally in rear combat zone depots such as Bracht 
and Antwerp.  The main problem was in the out-loading of stocks as much of the third line 
transport was to be provided by the Territorial Army (TA), and there would be a question as 
to how quickly the TA could be mobilised in the event of an emergency.  After battle was 
joined, NATO would fall back upon its Lines of Communications (LofC) with the logistic 
burden gradually reducing.  What was not fully appreciated was the vast quantities of 
ammunition that would be required on a day-to-day basis to supply mobile artillery batteries 
(up to 450 rounds per day per gun)13 and that logistic units would probably suffer high 
casualties in that “there will be logistic losses caused by attrition of the logistic chain with 
some losses perhaps as high as 50 per cent”.14 
 
The logistic structure of 1st (BR) Corps was based around both functional and hierarchical 
divisions of responsibility.  As a result, there was little integration of resources or joint 
planning, and so supplies had to pass through a series of functional ‘stove pipes’.15 
Information flows were thus fragmented and so the tracking of items whilst in transit was 
virtually impossible as was the gathering of real-time information regarding theatre stock 
levels.  As a counter, a just-in-case logistics system was operated with safety and buffer 
stocks operated throughout the supply chain. 
 
The Cold War ultimately created a stable situation in Europe and finally a stalemate.  The 
British Army had a thorough understanding of the doctrine and tactics of the potential 
adversary, a good idea of which direction the main attacks would come from and a detailed 
plan of how to fight the defensive battle.  The Cold War legacy has thus had a major impact 
on the current size and shape of the logistic organisations within the British Army. The main 
defensive battle would be fought with predetermined levels and methods of resupply and so 
little time and effort was spent on developing logistic methods that would help in force 
projection operations (asset tracking, modular transportation, strategic lift, inventory 
management etc.).  Thus, many of the underlying processes, concepts and philosophies have 
remained unaltered.  As such, the system of resupply is a multi-layered one of stock holding 
with inventory management at each level, and stock provisioning one level back.  Essentially, 
materiel is pushed forward to replenish the next level of stockholding to a predetermined 
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level. Of course, major costs are incurred by the amount of stock needed to fill the storage 
points, the time taken for stock to move forward and the general inefficiencies endemic in a 
‘back-to-front’ supply system.16 
 
The logistic system today is still based upon the traditional linear or echelon system, which is 
made up of lines of support.  The First Line is the combat service support (CSS) integral to 
the combat unit (usually battalion).  The Second Line is the CSS organic to the brigade or 
division.  The Third Line is the CSS that is provided behind the divisional rear area, but 
forward of the Point of Entry (POE) and finally the Fourth Line / Base is the CSS provided 
from the base organisation.  CSS at first, second and third line is provided by deployable 
forces, either organic to the combat units or those units that have been attached. Fourth line, 
in some instances, a Logistic Support Base Area, but in most, the Home Base, will include 
non-deployable storage locations, agencies (such as the Defence Procurement Agency (DPA) 
and Defence Logistics Organisation (DLO)) and support from the industrial base.17  
Although the logistics structure has been rationalised with initiatives such as ‘Front Line 
First’ and the Logistic Support Review, the current structure still has its origins firmly rooted 
in the Cold War. In many ways, continued reliance on a system developed for use if the Cold 
War turned hot in Central Europe is short sighted.  The move towards expeditionary warfare 
should entail the “adoption of more flexible processes as envisaged for Lean Logistics and 
enabled by JIT.”18 
 
Modern Commercial Practice 
 
Quality is synonymous with efficient, low-cost production and, in parallel with the quality 
productivity practices learnt from Deming, Toyota were developing an approach to 
productivity under the direction of Taiichi Ohno, a production engineer worker for the 
company.  Recognising that low levels of inventory could improve quality control, Toyota 
removed assembly line buffer stocks completely.  For manufacturing operations that were not 
linked by a physical assembly line, Ohno developed a system known as Kanban (an 
inventory management system).  In conjunction with the Kanban technique, Ohno developed 
other operating practices aimed at the elimination of wasteful practices.  These techniques are 
now commonly grouped together and called Just In Time.  This was underpinned by the 
concept of Kaizen, which can be interpreted as ‘continuous improvement’, that is, the 
continual examination of the product and processes to improve quality and performance. JIT 
is thus a ‘pull’ system, where the demand at the end of the logistics pipeline pulls in the 
direction of the market.  The flow of components at each stage is thus governed by the same 
demand.  “Thus no products should be made, no components ordered, until there is a 
downstream requirement”.19 
 
Between 1970 and 1974, the pricing policy of OPEC caused the price of crude oil to increase 
five fold. As a result, by 1974, Japan's economy had collapsed to a state of zero growth.  
Nevertheless, the Toyota Motor Company sustained greater earnings in 1975,1976 and 1977 
than any other company.   Of course, this invoked a great deal of interest from other Japanese 
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companies as to how Toyota had achieved this level of sustained earnings.  The answer was 
simple: Ohno at Toyota had developed the system of JIT production.  Ohno was also in a 
position of responsibility within the company to be able to implement JIT production 
methods.  In 1977, Kawasaki, aware of the JIT systems being developed by Toyota, seconded 
five of its engineers to Toyota for three months to study the manufacturing aspects of JIT.  
The migration of the JIT philosophy to production systems was soon to explode throughout 
the whole of Japan.  Indeed, Japan's economic success is a measure of the extensive use of 
JIT by Japanese business.  “There is no waste in business more terrible than over production.  
Industrial society must develop the courage, or rather common sense, to produce only what is 
needed when it is needed and in the amount needed”.20  
 
This view of production has been refined further and identified clearly as a means to 
“…banish waste and create wealth….”21  In turn, this has led to examination of business 
processes resulting in mapping the supply chain in order to gain comptetitive advantage.22  
Further development of this ‘lean’ approach is undertaken through the consideration of 
‘agility’ which when coupled with the benefits of being ‘lean’ can deliver greater ‘customer’ 
satisfaction.   
 
The term logistics came into general use in the US Army during the Second World War. It is 
a new term for a very old practice, and indeed logistics is still defined by some as the 
“movement, storage and supply of troops and equipment”23 and hence a mainly military 
endeavour.  However, the commercial sector started to copy many of the logistic techniques 
that had been used by the military and adopted a functional approach to supply chain 
management.  This however led to the sub-optimisation of the supply chain and the 
degrading of the logistics system.  To overcome this, companies began to integrate some of 
the logistic functions, beginning with materials management and physical distribution but 
soon extending to marketing and manufacturing.  The 1980s saw ‘channel integration’ which 
is defined as “co-ordinating the management of materials and finished goods, from the 
sourcing of raw materials through to the point of final consumption of finished products”.24 
A major benefit of this was that it supplemented the internal integrations that were occurring 
outside the boundaries of the individual corporation.  It hence includes all those suppliers and 
processes that are involved in providing a final product to the customer.  It has subsequently 
become known as the logistics supply chain. 
 
It has been increasingly apparent to commercial organisations that suppliers can make a 
significant contribution to the effectiveness of the supply chain.  Developing closer links, that 
is, ‘partnership sourcing’, can help companies achieve savings and improvements in 
performance.  Partnership sourcing has been defined as a situation “where customer and 
supplier develop such a close and long-term relationship that the two work together as 
partners.  It isn’t philanthropy: the aim is to secure the best commercial advantage.  The 
principle is that teamwork is better that combat …….. Partnership sourcing works because 
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both parties have an interest in each other’s success”.25  The leaders in this field have again 
been the Japanese with companies such as Toyota and Honda involving their suppliers at 
every stage of the production process.  Along with such supply chain integration many 
companies have rationalised their supplier base in order to continue the search for quality 
improvement and to more effectively manage customer-supplier relationships.  There has 
also been a move towards ‘transparency’26 which means that all parties in the supply chain 
have access to as much of the information as possible. 
 
While the term’s ‘partnership’ and ‘alliance’ have often been used interchangeably, they do 
refer to different things.  It could be said that partnerships refer to vertical relationships such 
as those between the customer and the supplier, whereas alliance refers to a horizontal 
relationship, such as that between two suppliers.  Strategic alliances are still favoured today 
with organisations owning complementary skills trying to take advantage of synergies 
between them to reduce costs and gain competitive advantage.  “In a global economy, a well-
developed ability to create and sustain fruitful collaborations gives companies a significant 
competitive leg-up.”27  A key feature of these sort of arrangements is the move away from 
the more adversarial stance as companies try and seek greater asset utilisation and faster 
responsiveness through such logistics collaboration. 
 
In recent years, Western companies have increasingly used outsourcing to gain competitive 
advantage.  This is “the process of transferring an existing business activity, including the 
relevant assets, to a third party”28 or even as “a contractual relationship between an external 
vendor and an enterprise in which the vendor assumes the responsibility for one or more 
business functions of the enterprise”.29  This has even extended to some of the activities and 
processes that have been traditionally carried out in-house.  This is due to a re-evaluation of 
vertical integration, which many firms find is too costly, and many firms are increasingly 
concentrating on what they consider their core competencies.  These are defined as “the basis 
upon which an organisation achieves strategic advantage in terms of activities, skills or 
know-how, which distinguish it from competitors and provide value to customers or 
clients”.30 
 
One of the main reasons that firms are starting to outsource is that it helps companies 
concentrate resources on what they consider the core elements of the business.  Outsourcing 
can remove the burden of managing peripheral activities that have little impact on the overall 
effectiveness of the company, but still take a disproportionate amount of time and effort. It 
allows a firm to concentrate its effort on the core activities while only needing to monitor the 
contract results, thus focusing on “what the enterprise does best.”31  It also helps the firm 
concentrate scare resources on those activities they consider the most vital, particularly 
capital assets where “outsourcing to avoid investment on what are considered to be non-core 
activities has been a key driver behind the trend towards outsourcing IT”.32  Finally, it allows 
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the firm to achieve reductions in its labour costs, where the third party contractor can achieve 
greater efficiency and quality. 
 
In today’s increasingly competitive environment, many companies have had to pay greater 
attention to supply chain issues.  As customers become more demanding, companies have 
had to insist on an improved service from their suppliers.  The concept of supply chain 
management (SCM) has developed partially as a result of this pressure to manage the 
complete logistics pipeline.  It is concerned with all the linkages and processes that are 
involved in the supply chain, from start to finish. SCM seeks to break down the barriers 
between the different processes and / or organisations in the supply chain to achieve greater 
efficiency and cut costs.  It seeks to set up a relationship between all the ‘players’ that gives 
benefits to all, by redefining organisational structures and contractual relationships. Indeed, 
“as we enter the 21st Century the need for a greater focus on the logistics processes that 
underpin supply chain effectiveness becomes ever more apparent”.33  SCM can be defined as 
“the management of upstream and downstream relationships with suppliers, distributors and 
customers in such a way that greater customer value is achieved at less total cost.”34  The 
increased trend to outsource, the need to reduce lead times and minimise inventory levels has 
made companies look at their supply chains very carefully. 
 
Central to the development of these new management philosophies has been the 
improvement in communication of information between parts of the supply chain.  This has 
been helped with the revolution in information technology (IT) of the last decade or so. 
“Information has always been central to the efficient management of logistics but now, 
enabled by technology, it is providing the driving force for competitive logistics strategy.”35 
The most popular methods of improving information flows are to use bar coding and 
Electronic Data Interchange (EDI). In using such IT, the speed of demand from customers for 
product information is increasing rapidly.  “By sharing information it enables supply chains 
to become demand chains and in so doing to deliver enhanced customer value”.36 
Information has become the enabler to what has become known as Quick Response logistics, 
which is a combination of JIT and IT.  The development of EDI, bar coding and Electronic 
Point of Sale (EPOS) has pointed the way forward, and organisations can use this 
information to plan production and delivery schedules. 
 
Levels of Conflict and Future Operations 
 
For a considerable period of time, logistics was seen purely as a support function. 
Increasingly however, logistics is being seen as a “key determinant in its own right, a crucial 
element of effective planning and an essential element of combat power”.37  This is 
reinforced by the view that “the Gulf War was kept short, sharp, and with the minimum 
casualties. I am in no doubt that the efficiency of the logistic back up was a major and critical 
factor in this achievement”.38  Future operations will tend to be multinational, and of course, 
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be joint in nature.  “The need is increasingly to help prevent or shape crises further away 
……. Most force projection operations of this kind are likely to be multinational”.39 To 
achieve this, national logistic arrangements must be flexible enough to give effective support 
to possible joint and multinational operations wherever they may occur. 
 
The future battlespace has been defined as “those portions of the sea, undersea, land, air and 
space environments and the electro-magnetic spectrum required for a particular operation”.40 
Forces will be increasingly joint, and be involved in multinational operations (rather like the 
Gulf War or Bosnia) rather than purely national operations (as in the Falklands War and 
Grenada). As such, force densities will be a lot lower, and there will be no clearly defined 
‘front’ or ‘rear’. Deployment will be more complex, non-linear and less dense, and be in 
terrain that has little or no strategic infrastructure or in an urban environment.  “The 
battlespace is changing as we move away from the linear battlefield of the Cold War to a 
non-linear, dynamic and fragmented battlespace. It is envisaged that high intensity conflict 
would take place in three dimensions, day and nigh, in all weathers and 24 hours a day.  This 
poses tremendous challenges for the support functions as the requirement, the tempo and 
intensity of operations increases”.41 
 
In the post cold War era, the replacement of the bipolar world with a multipolar one has 
meant that it is even more difficult to draw a line between war and peace. Conflicts that at the 
time seem small and far away, can still have consequences for countries not directly affected, 
as well as world trade and political stability.  Countries not directly involved may become 
involved through a variety of means, whether to monitor, prevent or manage the spread of a 
conflict or to rescue their nationals should a conflict erupt suddenly.  The spectrum of future 
conflict is increasingly being shown as a continuum with post and pre-conflict actions 
becoming just as important as warfighting.  For the UK, operations within an alliance or 
coalition and national operations are seen as priorities, and thus the Armed Forces must be 
structured so that they can operate throughout the whole spectrum of conflict and in joint and 
multinational operations.  This will have implications for interoperability, command and 
control and logistic support.42 
 
The Strategic Defence Review, in identifying the type of conflict in which UK Forces were 
likely to be involved and the scope of future operations, also recommended an increasingly 
commercial approach to the defence environment.  Smart Procurement was intended to bring 
a new approach to defence procurement43, seeking to overcome time delays, cost overruns 
and quality issues in bringing equipment into service.44   However, in many respects it 
sweeps up the preceding initiatives, such as Competing for Quality and Front Line First as 
well as providing impetus to the Private Finance Initiative/Public Private Partnership 
(PFI/PPP) approaches, focused within the defence environment.  In other ways it has 
developed beyond that which was originally envisaged at its introduction.  In addition to 
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developing Integrated Project Teams (IPTs) in managing the whole life of equipment45, it’s 
ethos and commercial nature have spread to the Defence Agencies, notably the Defence 
Logistics Organisation (DLO) and its various support elements.46 Within the DLO there is 
now a Non Project Procurement Office which co-ordinates and manages the purchase and 
supply of the myriad of equipment and items necessary to maintain and support the Armed 
Forces in achieving their aim.  The Smart Procurement Initiative has brought about a change 
in culture; one that links the 4th line, Home Base, closely to the Front Line and in doing so 
brings greater commercial influence to activities.47  Even the training and education of 
officers employed in logistics activities has to change to reflect the closer working together 
with commercial organisations.  A major strategy for improving performance in the future is 
Contractor Logistic Support48 and the whole issue of outsourcing49 brings this 
commercialisation into sharper focus in view of the need to achieve operational effectiveness 
in line with the requirements of the Strategic Defence Review as well as recognising the 
continually reducing budget allowance. 
 
The Way Forward: Future Logistic Requirements 
 
The current logistics system for the British Army is still based on a model developed to fight 
a main defensive battle in Northern Germany as part of an East – West confrontation.  It is 
clear that with the end of the Cold War, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union 
and the move to a multipolar world, that structure is no longer valid.  The new emphasis 
(espoused in SDR) on power projection operations and the changing nature of the battlespace 
will mean that the scale and intensity of future operations will be demanding for logistics 
forces.  A number of factors require the need for an overhaul of the current system: 
 
• Tempo – The success of the new manoeuvrist approach to warfare requires the 
achievement of a superior tempo at all levels of the operation. CSS functions will have to 
reduce logistic drag and still provide the greatest possible operational support. 
 
• Footprint – There is a clear need to reduce the logistic ‘footprint’ in theatre by 
minimising stock holdings, personnel and equipment to that required to achieve the 
operational objectives. 
 
• Efficiency – Over insurance from a JIC supply system and a waste of resources is one 
that cannot be afforded with shrinking defence budgets.  Mass must be replaced with 
speed and precision. 
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• Expeditionary Operations – The new emphasis on rapid deployment and sustainment of 
forces overseas will require a logistics infrastructure that is flexible, responsive and 
adaptable. 
 
• Technology – Much of this change is dependent on the harnessing of the Information 
Technology revolution, and to replace inventory with information, so resources can be 
tracked accurately from the factory to the foxhole. 
 
This leads to a consideration of the changes that the British Army has to make and what 
aspects of commercial logistics, allied with the cultural ethos and system changes 
implemented with Smart Procurement can be used in view of the possible scenarios for future 
operations. 
 
• Asset Visibility – In view of the reductions in the defence budget, total asset visibility is 
needed if those scarce resources are to be managed effectively.  This will hopefully allow 
improved control over the flow of resources from the home base to the theatre of 
operations, and enable scarce and vulnerable logistic assets to be directed to where they 
are needed most.  A major problem at the moment that needs to be rectified is the ability 
to monitor and predict battlefield requirements and demand throughout the supply chain 
as a whole.  This requires better diagnostic and prognostic tools and a better awareness of 
the logistic support system and supply chain on a holistic basis.  Better use of information 
technology, integrated with inventory management systems will be crucial in seeing those 
resources directed more efficiently.50 
 
• Modularity – the proposed new Army structure will include a number of ground 
formations that will be organised for specific operations with a range of capabilities.51  In 
the future, such forces may be required to operate in environments that have little or no 
logistic infrastructure, and differ widely in terrain, weather and intensity.  As such, a 
modular structure is required52 and which is defined as “a mechanism for optimising the 
flexibility of the standing force structure for the purpose of assembling coherent and 
timely force packages for operations.  A premium is placed on the availability of 
interchangeable force elements which can be readily be regrouped, while minimising 
disruption to formation and unit integrity at the point of deploying on operations.”53 
 
• Logistic Drag – The success of future operations will largely depend on reducing the 
logistic drag to a minimum in order to enhance the tempo of operations.  Such a reduction 
can only come about with the use of information technology to reduce inventory stock 
holding, increasing agility and reducing the number of logistics personnel deployed. 
 
• Directed Logistics – To combat the uncertainty created by the probable peaks and troughs 
of demand during an operation, a proactive directed logistics system, replacing inventory 
with information will need to be created.  Directed logistics is defined as the “ability to 
direct logistic effort efficiently and effectively where and when it is needed using 
information technology and guaranteed communications to improve prediction, flexibility 
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 Ibid. 
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and speed of response”.54  This will depend on effective battlefield information and 
inventory management systems. It should allow the reduction of vulnerable ground-
dumped stockpiles, a greater dispersion of materiel and an ability to quickly switch 
priorities.55 
 
• Contractor Logistic Support – Where major capability gaps exist in the logistics area, 
SDR highlighted the possibility of some of those gaps being filled through partnerships 
with industry.  The use of contractors to support operations overseas is a logical 
extension of the current use of them here in the UK (a form of outsourcing).  The aim of 
this use of contractors should be to release military personnel from mundane tasks and so 
reduce the overstretch felt by many logistic units.  It is sensible to suggest that contractors 
be used from the earliest stages as this would have the benefit of helping to prevent the 
capping levels to be exceeded.56  “Contractor logistic support can help to reduce the 
constraints imposed by overstretch, a finite manpower resource and an ever present 
political imperative to rate cap military numbers deployed on operations.”57  Contractor 
logistic support has in fact been documented as far back as the 16th Century58, and in the 
Gulf War, contributions from BAE Systems, Vickers and GKN had a major impact on the 
servicing and availability of equipment.59  The US Army has had a long history in using 
contractors in many of its operations.  Their importance has increased in the last few 
years due to the cut in the defence budget, the reductions in the size of the regular forces 
and the transfer of many of the CSS functions to the reserves.  While this has been mainly 
concentrated in peacetime locations, it has been recently expanded into the concept of 
‘Prime Vendor’.60  The Army believes that contractors can provide it with additional 
flexibility in responding to contingencies, and can augment current military capabilities 
in providing support requirements. However, they believe that contractors should not 
replace military assets within the overall force structure.61 
 
Conclusion 
 
Effective logistics support can provide a competitive advantage for organisations in the 
commercial world.  This could be emulated to a greater or lesser degree in the logistics 
systems and approaches of the British Army.  The changing operational deployments present 
significant challenges that differ from the old logistics approach which was geared to support 
and maintain a positional defensive battle to one that must be flexible, agile and responsive 
yet be lean and focused.  The need now is for logistic systems to support a range of diverse 
operational roles.  This can only be achieved by adopting and adapting many of the best 
practices used in industry.  There is a need for closer working relationships with defence 
service and manufacturing organisations; yet always there must be the realisation that 
commercial logistics and military logistics are different.  Technological advancement will 
enable many of the commercial approaches to be utilised, yet the balance between, and the 
understanding of, commercial practices and military requirements must be a key element of 
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the future of logistics. Logisticians must never forget the past, always understanding the 
present and operate with a clear vision for the future. 
